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WHITHER THE DISABILITY
RIGHTS MOVEMENT?
Robert W. Pratt*
LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT.
By Samuel R. Bagenstos. New Haven & London: Yale University Press.
2009. Pp. xii, 228. $48.
INTRODUCTION

While reading this book in 2010, almost twenty years to the date after
President George H.W. Bush signed the Americans with Disability Act
("ADA"), one realizes how much the world of politics has changed. It is
difficult to remember a time when such major legislation passed the U.S.
Senate by a vote of 91 to 6 and the House of Representatives by 377 to 28.'
Even more surprising, as we look back to 1990, is the fact that the executive
branch was controlled by a different political party than the legislative
branch. Contrast this legislative record with the milieu surrounding the
health care reform legislation of 2010 and the economic stimulus bill of
2009, and the overwhelming bipartisan vote on the ADA seems quite remarkable.
This unique legislative history provides the context for Professor Bagen-

stos's new book, Law and the Contradictions of the Disability Rights
Movement. In his book, Bagenstos traces how the often-diverging strands of
the disability rights movement coalesced to create change, and how the diversity of the movement is now inhibiting future change. In short,
Bagenstos's book is about the contradictions and tensions within the disabil-

ity rights movement and the law it forged. His analysis and conclusions are
very insightful and appear to be drawn from both his numerous articles on
the subject and his experience in the movement, including arguing several
significant ADA cases before the Supreme Court. Indeed, while there are
many aspects of Bagenstos's book that make it worth reading, his analysis
of the movement's core contradiction, its history, and its ongoing impact are
particularly helpful, even to those who have already had significant exposure to the ADA.

* Robert W. Pratt is the Chief Judge of the Southern District of Iowa. He has served as a
U.S. district judge since July 1, 1997. Before his appointment he practiced law for twenty-five years,
first as a Legal Aid Society lawyer and then as a private practitioner. His practice in both positions
involved substantial disability law including social security, supplemental security, and workers
compensation claims. He argued many disability cases in the Iowa appellate courts, the U.S. district
courts, and the U.S. courts of appeals.
1.

136 CONG. REc. 17,364-76 (1990); 136 CONG. REC. 17,280-97 (1990).
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MERGER OF IDEAS

As Bagenstos correctly points out, the ADA was a merger of ideas from
both conservative and liberal voices within the disability rights movement.
According to Bagenstos, traditionally conservative proponents of the ADA
favored its "anti-discrimination and accommodation model" because it appealed to their desire for "independence" from the overprotectiveness of the
government. To these conservatives, treating individuals as being "entitled"
to "special rights" because of their medical conditions was impermissibly
"paternalistic" (pp. 13-25). This idea also garnered support from disabled
people seeking the "dignity of risk," or, in other words, the ability to assume
personal responsibility for their lives and bear the consequences of their
choices. In contrast, Bagenstos forcibly argues that liberal proponents, adhering to traditional social welfare attitudes, rallied to the ADA's protection
because they saw the disabled as a class of people entitled to a protective
class status, similar to that of race, gender, and age. As Bagenstos points
out, this rudimentary ideological difference between the two core constituencies of the ADA lies at the heart of the contradictions in the law and in the
movement.
The historical background laid out by the author helps to bring out the
conflicting views of those who favored and worked for this legislation. I
believe most people, including myself, were not fully aware of this history. I
thought the ADA was a natural extension of other civil rights laws of the
1950s and 1960s. While this may be true in terms of legislative drafting and
hearings, this view overlooks the lengthy history of local and state government actions to fully integrate the disabled into civic life. According to
Bagenstos, the movement traces to the beginning of the Great Depression
and the forming of the League of the Physically Handicapped in New York
City, which was organized to protest discrimination by both the state and the
federal government (p. 13). While New York and the federal government
ultimately began passing progressive policies, believing that a disability
exempted an individual from the "ordinary responsibilities" of work while
entitling him to "relief' from a compassionate government, the league ultimately criticized these reforms. It began to view the money, housing, and
other benefits as a stigmatizing and alienating force that pushed the disabled
away from society. In other words, the league saw many progressive policies
as a mere codification of discrimination and accordingly, it demanded work
opportunities instead of "charity."
One note of concern, however, is that in tracing the history of the
movement from the Great Depression to the present, Bagenstos overlooks
some legislative efforts that greatly affected the movement. For example, he
makes no mention of the expansion of the Social Security Act in the mid1950s, which provided disability benefits to those unable to do sustained
work activity. Similarly, no mention is made of the 1970s Supplemental Security Income legislation, which sought to provide subsistence entitlements
to poor and disabled individuals.
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IN THE COURTS

Bagenstos's discussion of several key historical Supreme Court cases interpreting the ADA also provides useful insight into the core contradiction
inherent in the disability rights movement. As an initial matter, Bagenstos
notes that the Supreme Court has never adopted a "universalist approach,"
which would require both antidiscrimination and accommodation measures
for any physical or mental difference (p. 24). Instead the Court, especially in
more recent cases, has adopted an admittedly "demanding standard," requiring that a plaintiff show a "substantial limitation" by demonstrating that his
impairment either prevents or severely restricts him from doing activities
that are of central importance to most individuals' daily lives. As Bagenstos
persuasively argues, the failure to adopt such a standard lies more with the
failure of the movement to come to a consensus itself, rather than with the
judiciary, because universalist measures "would have almost certainly not
passed" in Congress. Additionally, Bagenstos's often-harsh critique of more
recent cases by the Supreme Court reveals the diversity in the movement.
Bagenstos believes the Court's jurisprudence essentially holds that those
who can obtain work, even with assistive devices and medication, should do
so, thereby limiting society's financial assistance to only those who absolutely cannot obtain employment. This approach coincides with the
antipaternalistic and independent mentality of the conservative strand of the
movement. Finally, in discussing discrimination against the disabled and
2. One minor criticism I have of Bagenstos's analysis of Supreme Court jurisprudence is
his decision not to discuss School Board v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), which interpreted the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the "RA"). In Arline, the Court found that a school teacher afflicted with the
contagious disease of tuberculosis was a "handicapped individual" within the meaning of the RA.
Id. In so holding, the Court set forth an expansive view of individuals protected by the RA and
spoke about congressional concern for the "handicapped," as well as the attempt to combat the
effects of the public's "'archaic attitudes and laws' " toward the disabled. Id. at 279 (quoting S. REP.
No. 93-1297, at 50 (1974)). To me, the Court's analysis and concern sheds light on the congressional thinking behind the adoption of the ADA.
A careful reading of Arline tells us much about the congressional history of legislating in the
disability area. As the Arline Court tells us, the RA was originally intended to remedy unfairness in
the employability of disabled persons. Id. at 278 n.3. After reviewing the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare's attempts to devise regulations to implement the RA, however, Congress
found such a focus "too narrow to deal with the range of discriminatory practices in housing, education, and health care programs which stemmed from stereotypical attitudes and ignorance about the
handicapped." Id. (citing S. REP. No. 93-1297, at 16, 37-38, 50). Accordingly, Congress expanded
the RA in 1974 to define the term "handicapped individual" to include, "[Any person who (i) has a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life
activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment."
Id. at 278-79 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1974)). When it enacted the ADA, Congress specifically noted as follows:
The first purpose is to make applicable the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of
disability, currently set out in regulations implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, to all programs, activities, and services provided or made available by state and local
government or instrumentalities or agencies thereto, regardless of whether or not such entities
receive Federal financial assistance.
H.R. REP. No. 101-485(1), at 84 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 366. In keeping with
the "extension" of the RA, Congress defined "disability" using virtually identical language to that
used to define "handicapped individual" under the RA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006). Moreover, in
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the requirement of accommodating such individuals, he draws a very important and, I think, frequently overlooked distinction. An antidiscrimination
requirement demands that an employer disregard an individual's protected
class status and treat that individual as he would anyone else. An accommodation requirement, by contrast, requires that the employer take account of
the individual's protected class status and treat that individual in a way he
might not treat anyone else. Personally, I tend to favor the accommodation
concept because it is much like the remedy of affirmative action, in that an
individual with impairments cannot be expected to compete with an otherwise able-bodied individual without some accommodation.
Bagenstos provides further insight into the ongoing, rudimentary contradiction in the movement by focusing on relatively current social and legal
issues that have divided the community. For example, Bagenstos provides an
interesting discussion of the controversy surrounding end-of-life and quality-of-life decisions through the 2005 Terri Schiavo case (p. 100). Despite
the near unanimous claims from all sides that they were acting in her best
interests and against the proverbial "big government," some favored legislation to preserve her life while others viewed such measures as paternalistic
governmental and societal pressure intruding on her right to make personal
medical decisions. Similarly, he details the split in the disability-rights
community in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision a few years earlier
in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal.' In that case, a worker was denied em-

ployment by his employer because of a liver condition that doctors said
would be exacerbated by continued exposure to toxins at the refinery where
he worked. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission had promulgated a regulation that permitted the employer to defend on the basis that the
worker's impairment or disability itself would pose a "direct" threat to his
health. The worker argued that this was discrimination. The employer defended the regulation, and the Supreme Court upheld it. Again, this seems
like a classic example of Bagenstos's observations about paternalism and his
"dignity of risk" argument. Many liberals view the holding as a rejection of
years of work meant to guarantee safer workplaces for the vulnerable and to
provide a check on corporate power to have workers toil in unsafe environments.

drafting the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Congress expressly stated that one of the purposes of
the Act was to:
reject the Supreme Court's reasoning in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999)
with regard to coverage under the third prong of the definition of disability and to reinstate the
reasoning of the Supreme Court in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273
(1987) which set forth a broad view of the third prong of the definition of handicap under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101). Given these considerations and the unquestionable significance of the RA as a statutory
predecessor to the ADA, I am puzzled as to why Bagenstos declined to undertake a broad discussion
of Arline.
3.

536 U.S. 73 (2002).

April 2011]1

Whither the Disability Rights Movement?

III.

1107

THE FUTURE OF THE ADA

Finally, Bagenstos looks to the future of the movement, thereby providing further analysis into its internal tensions. He argues that for the
movement to achieve any new legislative progress, it must understand its
own pluralism, specifically by understanding the difficulty in both defining
disability and deciding how our society should respond to the disabled. As a
first step, Bagenstos argues for a conceptual shift away from the dominant
medical model of disability to, perhaps, a more consensus-building social
model. The social model views disability as a social creation; that is, a
product of societal practices such as failing to cut curbs. It places the responsibility of eliminating the social and physical structures that create
disability on society (Introduction).
Bringing such a change to fruition will, however, be difficult. For example, judges such as myself tend to think of discrimination in terms of
evidentiary burdens, analyzing these claims in terms of direct evidence or
indirect evidence. A burden-shifting analysis, however, seems contradictory
to the "social model." Nevertheless, the pragmatic force of such a change
might be more obtainable because the accommodation remedy in the social
model is very familiar, in that it is similar to the remedies available in race,
age, and gender cases.
While Bagenstos goes on to articulate additional thoughts on how the
movement should progress, he highlights a critical truth about the movement and our society: it is not realistic to believe that we can eliminate
discrimination against the disabled by abandoning the proverbial "welfare
state," as many conservative voices suggest. Having a substantial background in legal aid and private practice involving disability law under the
Social Security Act, I struggle to understand or appreciate those voices that
equate accommodations or protections for the disabled with welfare, a
viewpoint Bagenstos refers to as a "wariness about welfare state." I think of
disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act as more akin to
private insurance contracts, albeit under the auspices of the federal government. This is to say, the worker and his employer pay Federal Insurance
Contributions Act wage taxes to the Social Security Administration, and
when the worker meets certain conditions in terms of an insured status, including by meeting the statutory disability definition (inability to perform
substantial work activity), the worker receives cash benefits with a medical
entitlement (Medicare or Medicaid). This is not welfare, to my mind; rather,
it is dignity and part of the social contract between a citizen and her government. Perhaps my view of the social contract is reflective of my personal view
that a government has a duty to provide a floor of dignity for the disabled.
Naturally, a contrary view or a lack of understanding of the strain endured by
disabled persons may cause some to perceive the disability rights movement
and governmental efforts related thereto as overly paternalistic. Regardless,
as Bagenstos notes, the reality is that people with disabilities need some
assistance, whether it be medical, vocational, or otherwise; and to attempt to
change the lives of the disabled without this assistance is not possible. As he
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does in other portions of his book, however, Bagenstos notes the tension
inherent in the movement and argues that any undue interference, however
well-intentioned, may erode the autonomy and dignity of the disabled. On
the whole, Bagenstos aptly describes a movement that is full of contradictions because it is based upon the balancing of two diverging ideologies.
CONCLUSION

Bagenstos's book sets out many of the contradictory ideas underlying
the ADA and many contradictions within the legislation itself. The book
explains why academics, legislators, and the judiciary have struggled so
much in attempting to determine the appropriate scope of the ADA. While
Bagenstos's history of the disability rights movement is interesting and enlightening, the book concludes with what I believe is, ultimately, the only
correct response to these contradictions. If we desire a country that is truly
egalitarian, some level of governmental action and intervention in the private economy is necessary to ensure equality for those Americans who
would otherwise be left out. While certainly we are all interested in protecting ourselves from an overabundance of governmental intrusion, the notion
that legislation designed to ensure equal rights for disabled persons is overly
protective or intrusive is confounding. Disabled persons are not entitled to
more benefits than anybody else; they are, however, entitled to enjoy the
same quality of life that nondisabled people enjoy. The obstacles of daily
life make such equality difficult, if not impossible, without protections and
accommodations that can be achieved and implemented only through appropriate governmental intervention. To that end, I am confident that
Bagenstos's book will stimulate continued debate between those who acknowledge the shortfalls of the ADA and those who believe deeply in
equality.

